

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What is intent filter verification service

What is intent filter verification service app. What is intent filter verification service on android. Can i disable intent filter verification service. Is intent filter verification service safe. What is intent filter verification service com.android.statementservice android.

I used apktool to find the following data: it is not a picture or a shared library, which is not backed up, seems to use some custom permissions (intent_filter_verification_agent, bind_intent_filter_verifier, intent_filter_needs_verification) has a broadcast receiver, then presumably this needs Check stuff that is happening at the operating system level, is a service. I tried to read the reversed code, but I have no experience with SMALI and, therefore, did not make many significant progress. Subsequently, I used androguard to make a graphic call: androcg.py --output intent-filter.gml - Iso-isolated intent filter verification_com.android.statementservice.apk … then I turned this into a ' Image: Import NetworkX as NX import matplotlib.pyplot as PLT IFV = nx.read_gml ('intent-filter.gml') filter # Some things of the system, I think ifv = ifv.subgraph ([to one a ifv.nodes () if Non 'Landroid' in a] # filter Some Java Things Type of Utilities, I believe IFV = ifv.subgraph ([to one at ifv.nodes (), if not 'Ljava / lang' in a] isolated = NX .isolates (IFV) NONISOLATES = List (set (IFV.NODES ()) - SET (isolated)) = IFV IFV.SUBRAPH (NONISOLATES) RELABELER = {KEY: KEY.SPLIT () [0] .Split ('/') [- 1] for key iFV.Nodes ()} IFVN = NX.Relabel_Nodes (IFV, Rellabeler) IFVN.REMOVE_EDGES_FROM (NX.SELFLOOP_EDGES (IFVN)) NX.DRAW (IFVN, WITH_LABELS = TRUE) FIG = PLT.GCF () FIG .set_size_inches (18, 10) fig.savefig ('intent-filter.jpg', dpi = 200) ott Engo this: my suspicion from the name of the service is that it actually take an intention and determines whether or not that it satisfies the intent (grammar? of the …) Intent filter of each exportable component publicly declared in each manifest.xml for all applications on the device. This invitation chart looks like supporting my hypothesis. In particular, the URL died with a ton of outgoing edges, the nodes at the center-ring of look type of look, such as verification or filtration of some kind (analysis of an extended nano message, looking at a response of the Network, pulling data from intent, getting a web port, check if a protocol is valid or invalid …), and finally the largest number of external elements that have only entering incoming type of seeming or are in Execution of the purpose by passing it to a destination (for example, httpurlconnection ->, NetworkResponse, Androidappasset, …), or discard as invalid (invalidprotocolbuffernanoexception, resistancefollewredirects, utofspaceexception, …). I'm just an amateur investigator and I can't say you really know what all this means, but this is my 10 cents. I believe the service constitutes the connection between an invocate Intent and all intentfilters in applications on the device. I think he decides what he goes to what app, if something has invalid data, as in a scenario nothing fuzzing, and if something has to go to the web. I believe that there is also a sort of infinite-redirection attack. I suspect this is an effort by the Android development team for the defense against communication between connections (ICC) and the URI Vulnerabilità Connecting App /. I hope this helps! J'ai utilisÃ © apktool pour trouver les dÃƒ © code suivants: ce n'est pas u framework of the United Nations bibliothÃ¨que partagÃƒ une Â Â © and, the n'est pas sauzzardÃ Â Â Â ©, the semble utilizer certaines of authorizations personnalisÃƒ Â © © © © © (intent_filter_verification_agent, bind_intent_filter_verifier, intent_filter_needs_verification) The a rÃƒ © cepteur de diffusion, dong ce truc de vÃƒ rification des besoins se pass probblement au niveau du systÃƒÂ¨me d ' Exploitation, c'est service one. J'AI ESSAYÃƒ Â © De Lire of the Reverse Code Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â © Mais Je N'AI Aucune Expa Â Â © RIENCE AVEC SMALI ET N'AI PAS DONC FAIT DE PROGRÃƒÂ¨S significifs. With bathroom, J'ai utilisÃ © androguard CRÃƒ © er A Graphique D'appel: androcg.py --output intent-filter.gml --no-isolated intent filter verification service_com.android.statementservice.apk … puis je the to transform Â © EN Uno Image: Import NetworkX as matplotlib.pyplot NX Import as PLT IFV = NX.Read_GML ('intent-filter.gml' filter # Some things of the system, I have IFV = ifv.subgraph ([a for one in ifv.nodes () 'Landroid' except in]) # filter a certain type of java stuffing utility, I think ifv = ifv.subgraph ([a for one in iFv.nodes ( ), if not 'ljava / lang' in a]) = nx.isolates blocks (IFV) nonisolates = list (set (ifv.nodes ()) - set (isolated)) = IFV ifv.subgraph (nonisolates) Relabeler = { Legend: Key.Split () [0] .Split ('/') [- 1] To type iFV.Nodes ()} = IFVN NX.Relabel_Nodes (IFV, Remables) IFVN.REMOVE_EDGES_FROM (NX.SELFLOOP_EDGES (IFVN)) NX.DRAW (IFVN, with_labels = true) fig = plt.gcf () fig.set_size_inches (18, 10) fig.savefig, dpi = 200) I understand: my soupe on the name of the service is that in reality it takes a Intent and determined if this responds to intention or not (grammar? of …) Filter The purpose of each exportable component released publicly in each manifest.xml for all applications on the device. This call chart seems somehow supports my Hypothese. In particular, the URL is a dead point with a ton of outgoing arches, the nodes of the central trick ring seem to be a sort of vanding or filtration (analyze a retired nano message, look at a network restore, extract the data from The intent, get a web port, check if a protocol is valid or invalid …), and finally the most external elements that have only incoming edges seems as if the intent is performed by switching to a destination (for example , Httpurconnection ->, NetworkResponse, Androidappasset, …), or reject it as invalid (invalidprotocolbafetheexception, resistancefollowredirdires, utofspaceexception, …). They are just an amateur detention and I can't really know what all this means, but they are my 10 cents. I believe that the maintenance forms the connection between an invoked intent and the entire instfilter in the applications of the appliance. I think he decides what's going on that application, if something has data with disabilities, as in a scenario at zero fuzzing, and if something has to go to the web. I believe that there is also a sort of infinite redirection attack. I suspect that this is an effort by the Android development team to decline against connections between communication components (ICC) and the Vulnery of the application / URI connection. I hope it helps you! ID Weakness: 925 Abstraction: Varianstructure: SimpleStatus: Incomplete DescriptionThe Android Application uses a transmission receiver that receives an unrestroan does not correctly verify that the intent has come from an authorized Source. DescriptionCertAn extended intest types, identified by string action, it cannot be transmitted by the operating system itself, not for third-party applications. However, when a application records to receive these implicit system interest, it was also recorded to receive any explicit extended. While a harmful application cannot send an implicit intent system, it can send an explicit intent required to the target, which may presume that each intent receibed is a valid implicit system and not an intact explicit from another application. This can lead to unintended behavior. Platformsthis applicable list shows possible areas for which the given weakness may appear. These can be called for specific languages, operating systems, architectures, paradigms, technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed with the frequency with which the given weakness appears for that instance.languages â €

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